As discussed in my post of December 5, 2006, the MPRSA contains two mental elements: “knowledge” and “purpose.” First, to establish criminal liability, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly transported materials from the United States for the purpose of dumping it into ocean waters. The word “purpose” contained in a
statute generally connotes a specific state of mind with respect to the conduct of transporting materials. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978). Second, to establish criminal liability, the Government must, in addition, prove that the defendant knowingly transported materials from the United States without a permit for the purpose of dumping into ocean waters.
The first mental element the Government must prove in a criminal prosecution under the MPRSA is that the defendant’s conduct meets each of the four conduct elements, and each must have been done “for the purpose of dumping into ocean waters. “Purpose” is a state of mind closely akin to “intent”, but requiring a greater degree of culpability than “intent.” 1 W. LaFave and A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, at 305 (1986). Purpose is more than mere knowledge of facts or of a high likelihood that events will occur in the future. Rather, purpose means the bringing about of certain consequences is the aim or design of an act.
The Supreme Court stated, in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), that a person who causes a particular result is said to act “purposefully” if “‘he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct . . .. “ Id. at 445, quoting, W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law, at 196 (1972). The Supreme Court’s definition is also embodied in the Model Penal Code. Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(a)(i). In connection with the nature of the conduct, a person acts “purposely” if “it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature.” Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(a)(i). In connection with the attendant circumstances, a person acts “purposely” if “he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.” Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(a)(ii).
Under the MPRSA, the Government must show that the defendant allegedly transporting material had as an ultimate aim or design the dumping of material into the ocean. Phrased differently, the Government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the “conscious object” of the person transporting the material to dump that material into the ocean. See United States v. Reedy, 632 F.Supp. 1415, 1422-23 (W.D. Okla. 1986), aff’d, 845 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1988) (The term “purpose” in child pornography statute provides state of mind requirement for conduct element of “producing a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct.”).
The above interpretation of the purpose state of mind under the MPRSA is supported by its legislative history which indicates that MPRSA was not intended to reach transportation of materials, the primary purpose of which was not dumping into the ocean. The Senate Report accompanying the Bill that ultimately became the MPRSA contained a section-by-section analysis of the Bill written by USEPA that contains the following language: “Special note should also be made that 'dumping' in subsection 3(f) would not include an activity which has as its primary purpose a result other than the 'disposition of material' but which involves the incidental depositing of some debris or other material in the relevant waters." S.Rept. No. 92-532, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News, at 4234.
If the dumping of material into the ocean is merely incidental to its primary purpose, it is not prohibited by the MPRSA.
More later.
As always, feel free to call me or e-mail me with any questions at walter.james@jamespllc.com.
WDJiii
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