The Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act (“MPRSA”) imposes a blanket prohibition on the un-permitted disposal of “material” into ocean waters. This characterization requires the MPRSA to be narrowly construed because of its vast breadth and its ability to criminalize apparently innocent conduct
permitted under international law. In order to convict a defendant for a violation of the MPRSA, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements: 1) That the defendant was a “person’ within the meaning of 33 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1); 2) who knowingly; 3) transported from the United States; 4) without a permit; 5) any material; 6) for the purpose of dumping it; 7) into ocean waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1411 (a)(1).
The MPRSA criminal provisions state, in part: “Except as may be authorized by a permit issued pursuant to [the MPRSA] and subject to regulations issued pursuant to section 1418 of this title, no person shall transport from the United States . . . any material for the purpose of dumping into ocean waters.” 33 U.S.C. S 141l(a)(1). The MPRSA provides that, in addition to any civil action, a person who knowingly violates the MPRSA, regulations promulgated under the MPRSA, or a permit issued under the MPRSA shall be fined and/or imprisoned for not more than five years or both.
The MPRSA differs from other environmental crimes in that, by its terms, it is a specific intent crime. The MPRSA contains two mental elements: “knowledge” and “purpose.” First, to establish criminal liability, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly transported materials from the United States for the purpose of dumping it into ocean waters. The word “purpose” contained in a statute generally connotes a specific state of mind with respect to the conduct of transporting materials. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978). Second, to establish criminal liability, the Government must, in addition, prove that the defendant knowingly transported materials from the United States without a permit for the purpose of dumping into ocean waters. The word “knowingly” also defines a state of mind with respect to an act of transporting, but also applies to the surrounding factual circumstances (i.e. the absence of a permit) and the legal requirements (i.e. the permit requirement). See, United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). The Supreme Court has stated that generally, “‘purpose’ corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent, while ‘knowledge’ corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent.” United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980); W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, § 28, pp. 201-2 (1972).
More later.
As always, feel free to call me or e-mail me with any questions at walter.james@jamespllc.com.
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